Let’s Not Worry about the Reclamation Worry by Bianca Cepollaro
181
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVII, No. 50, 2017
Let’s Not Worry about 
the Reclamation Worry
BIANCA CEPOLLARO
IFILNOVA Institute of Philosophy, 
New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
In this paper, I discuss the Reclamation Worry (RW), raised by Ander-
son and Lepore 2013 and addressed by Ritchie (2017) concerning the 
appropriation of slurs. I argue that Ritchie’s way to solve the RW is not 
adequate and I show why such an apparent worry is not actually prob-
lematic and should not lead us to postulate a rich complex semantics 
for reclaimed slurs. To this end, after illustrating the phenomenon of 
appropriation of slurs, I introduce the Reclamation Worry (section 2). In 
section 3, I argue that Richie’s complex proposal is not needed to explain 
the phenomenon. To show that, I compare the case of reclaimed and non-
reclaimed slurs to the case of polysemic personal pronouns featuring, 
among others, in many Romance languages. In section 4 I introduce the 
notion of ‘authoritativeness’ that I take to be crucial to account for rec-
lamation. In section 5, I focus on particular cases (the “outsider” cases) 
that support my claims and speak against the parsimony of the indexi-
cal account. Finally, I conclude with a methodological remark about the 
ways in which the debate on appropriation has developed in the litera-
ture (section 6).
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1. Introduction
In this paper, I discuss a worry raised by Anderson and Lepore (2013)
and addressed by Ritchie (2017) concerning the appropriation of slurs, 
namely the Reclamation Worry (RW). My aim is to show that despite 
appearances the Reclamation Worry is not worrisome and could be 
addressed by simply relying on contextual meaning determination: 
no indexical account à la Ritchie is needed. To this end, I present a 
more parsimonious answer to the apparent problem raised by the RW. 
Finally, I introduce and discuss the notion of ‘authoritativeness’ and 
conclude with a methodological remark about the ways in which the 
debate on appropriation has developed in the literature.
Let us start from defi ning Reclamation. Reclamation (or ‘appropria-
tion’, I use the terms interchangeably) is the phenomenon for which, 
under certain conditions, speakers can use a slur in such a way that the 
slur is not derogatory nor offensive anymore in those contexts; on the 
contrary, appropriated slurs are used to express solidarity and under-
line intimacy. Typically, in-groups can use the slur targeting their own 
group in such a reclaimed way. However, over time, non-derogatory 
uses can become available for out-groups, too. This is for example what 
happened to the term ‘gay’, that used to be derogatory and nowadays it 
is neutral, after a process of appropriation (see Brontsema 2004). This 
suggests that reclamation is able to challenge the derogatory potential 
of slurs and, in time, even delete it. Such a process is on-going for other 
terms that still have a derogatory use (such as ‘queer’) or terms that 
can typically be used non-derogatorily by in-groups only (such as ‘nig-
ger’).
Reclamation is a very problematic topic in the growing literature1 
about pejoratives partly because it constitutes an example of meaning 
change: thanks to reclamation, slurs can be used, under adequate con-
ditions, in a positive way that differs “dramatically” from their original 
derogatory meaning (see Potts 2007: 266). One can account for such 
a change of meaning in (at least) two different ways: by defending an 
echoic account or by defending a polysemic account. The echoic expla-
nation consists in interpreting the reclaimed positive use of slurs as 
non-literal derivative uses of language (see Bianchi 2014, Miščević and 
Perhat 2016: 140, Cepollaro 2017). Slurs have derogatory literal mean-
ing also in reclaimed uses, but speakers can use it in a positive way 
thanks to irony. Reclamation is analyzed by these authors as an in-
stance of ironic use of language (which is, in relevance theoretic terms, 
an echoic use of language: Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson and Sper-
ber 2012). An alternative way to understand the change of meaning 
stemming from appropriation is to claim that slurs, under the right 
circumstances, acquire a new non-pejorative literal meaning (see i.a. 
Miščević 2011, Ritchie 2017). Such a process results in the ambiguity 
1 See i.a. Potts (2007: 266), Hom (2008: 428, 438), Richard (2008: 16), Saka (2007: 
146-147), Jeshion (2013: 250-253), Whiting (2013: 370), all quoted in Ritchie (2017).
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between two lexical items: the old derogatory slur and the reclaimed 
positive ex-slur. The Reclamation Worry, to which I now turn, espe-
cially targets such a polysemic account of reclamation. In this paper, I 
leave aside the echoic account, as my main (and more modest) aim here 
is just to establish whether the Reclamation Worry (i) is indeed worri-
some and (ii) should be taken as supporting an indexical semantics for 
reclaimed uses of slurs.
2. The Reclamation Worry
Ritchie (2017) phrases the Reclamation Worry, already voiced by An-
derson and Lepore,2 in the following way: 
Content-based views that posit an ambiguity to account for reclamation 
cannot account for why only members in the target group can use a re-
claimed slur to express a non-offensive/positive meaning. (Richie 2017: 157)
It looks problematic – or at least challenging – to explain why, given 
two meanings that an expression can have, one particular meaning is 
available to a certain subset of speakers, but not to others. There seems 
to be a contrast, Ritchie argues, between standard cases of ambigu-
ity/polysemy and the behavior of appropriated and non-appropriated 
uses of slurs. In standard cases of polysemy, all the meanings that an 
expression can have are potentially available to any speaker. Consider 
standard instances of polysemy, for example, ‘mouse’. In principle, any-
one can access any of the two meanings of ‘mouse’, as anyone can use 
the term to refer either to the mammal or to the electronic device. In 
other words, there are no restrictions with respect to who can felici-
tously access each meaning. On the other hand, not every speaker can 
felicitously use slurs as reclaimed.
Since scholars got interested in slurs and pejoratives, the phenome-
non of appropriation has caught the attention of many. The question as 
to how and why reclaimed uses of slurs are possible for certain people 
and not for others challenged philosophers and linguists, but it also 
gave rise to a debate outside academia: there are many ways in which 
tv-series, movies and even cartoons assess the issue of who can and 
who cannot use slurs in positive ways.3
2 “Ambiguity fails to explain why non-members cannot utilize a second sense 
[that is, the non-pejorative sense]. If it were just a matter of distinct meanings, why 
can’t any speaker opt to use a slur non-offensively? (…) Ambiguity is useless here” 
(Anderson and Lepore 2013a: 42).
3 Here are some interesting examples. In the tv-series Treme (2010), Season 1 
episode 5 titled ‘Shame shame shame’, Davies, a white guy, gets punched after using 
the word ‘nigger’ in a bar attended by black people, even though he was identifying 
himself with the black community. An interesting fact is that Davies is explicitly 
quoting another character, Antoine Baptiste, who is in fact black (“I can only quote 
Antoine Baptiste: New Orleans niggers will fuck up a wet dream. Media freak the 
fuck out. The cops looking for any excuse to clamp down”). The explicit quotation 
does not save him from getting punched, nor does the fact that he identifi es with the 
black community of New Orleans.
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In her paper, Ritchie offers a solution to the Reclamation Worry 
that accounts for the allegedly peculiar ambiguity between reclaimed 
and non-reclaimed slurs by claiming that the lexical meaning of re-
claimed slurs features an occurrence of the plural fi rst-person indexi-
cal pronoun ‘we’. A reclaimed use of ‘bitch’, for example, conveys for 
Ritchie something along the lines of “We women are laudable for being 
women”.4 Only in-groups (women, in this case) can access the reclaimed 
slur because they are the only ones who can felicitously use the indexi-
cal ‘we’. When an out-group (a man, in this case) tries to use ‘bitch’ in 
a positive way, he fails to convey a positive content such as “We women 
are laudable for being women”, because he cannot felicitously use the 
indexical ‘we’.
In other words, Ritchie grants that the RW constitutes a challenge 
for content-based accounts of slurs that explain reclamation in terms of 
ambiguity, as appropriation gives rise to a particular case of ambiguity 
that diverges from standard instances of in that, because of the in-
dexical ‘we’, only certain speakers can felicitously access the reclaimed 
meanings. The challenge for Ritchie’s indexical account is to explain 
how out-groups can felicitously use slurs in a positive or non-derogato-
ry way: I come back to this issue in greater detail in section 5.
In what follows, I show that despite appearances the Reclamation 
Worry is not worrisome and that an indexical account of reclaimed 
slurs is not needed. I will not refute Ritchie’s proposal: rather, I will 
show that (i) no indexical pronoun in the reclaimed use of slurs is to 
be postulated to satisfactorily answer the Reclamation Worry (section 
3) and that (ii) all the ingredients that are needed to answer the RW 
without postulating hidden indexicals are already employed by Ritchie 
to explain the outsider cases, namely out-groups using slurs non-derog-
atorily (section 4). I conclude that more parsimonious responses to the 
RW should be preferred and that the indexical explanation of Reclama-
tion needs further justifi cation to be defended.
Before discussing my own solution to the RW, let me make a brief 
remark about the theories that are allegedly challenged by such a 
worry. The authors who discussed the Reclamation Worry, including 
Ritchie, focus on the so-called ‘content-based’ account of slurs, that is, 
the theories according to which slurs lexically encode some kind of de-
In the 2016 cartoon Zootopia, a bunny police-offi cer is called ‘cute’ by her cheetah-
colleague; she tells him: “Ooh, uh, you probably didn’t know, but a bunny can call 
another bunny ‘cute’, but when other animals do it, it’s a little...”. The cheetah police-
offi cer is mortifi ed.
In the tv-series Atlanta (2016), Season 1 episode 04 titled ‘The Streisand Effect’, 
a character named Zan goes to Alfred, a black rapper, and calls him “My nigga”. 
Alfred’s answer is “Are you even black?”. Afterwards the characters discuss and 
make hypotheses about Zan’s mysterious ethnic origins which are taken to be crucial 
in order to establish whether his use of ‘nigga’ was legitimate or not.
4 Note that Ritchie is neutral with respect to which particular content-based 
account captures best the semantics and the pragmatics of slurs. Such a proposal 
should therefore be taken to be compatible with possibly any content-based view.
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rogatory content (however such a lexical component could be analyzed: 
truth conditions, conventional implicatures, presuppositions, etc.). 
This label is meant to distinguish this fi rst type of theories from those 
that challenge the very idea that a thick and rich semantics for slurs is 
needed. For such accounts, that we can call content-less (or “defl ation-
ary”) (Anderson and Lepore 2013a), the derogatory content associated 
with slurs is not part of their encoded or lexical meaning. They ac-
count for the pejorative power of slurs by relying on various mecha-
nisms: Anderson and Lepore (2013a, 2013b) talk about taboo effects, 
edicts and language prohibitions, Bolinger (2015) relies on contrastive 
preferences, Nunberg (forthcoming) introduces the notion of manner 
ventriloquistic implicatures, Rappaport (ms) analyzes the pejorative 
content of slurs in terms of the relevance-theoretic notion of ‘showing’. 
Prima facie, the phenomenon of appropriation is less problematic for 
such accounts, as they are not committed to the claim that slurs lexi-
cally encode derogatory content (and therefore they do not have to posit 
polysemy to explain appropriation). However, it is not entirely correct 
to conclude that they are not challenged by the meaning change that 
we observe in appropriation, as, if these theories need to explain how 
slurs are systematically associated with derogatory contents, then they 
also need to explain how and why such an association can fail to hold 
in reclamation contexts. So, if the Reclamation Worry was posing a 
problem for content-based account of slurs, then it would potentially 
pose a challenge for all theories of slurs. In what follows, I argue that 
this is not the case.
3. Ambiguity and social meaning
As we said, the Reclamation Worry was originally voiced by Anderson 
and Lepore as a potential argument against the content-based theo-
ries, even though the authors already suggest that in order to save the 
account, content-based theorists could add an extra story to explain 
why the non-derogatory use of slurs is only accessible to a certain sub-
set of speakers. This ‘extra story’ is exactly what Ritchie aims to add, 
by arguing that the lexical meaning of reclaimed slurs involves the oc-
currence of a plural fi rst-person pronoun that imposes constraints on 
who can use the reclaimed slur: for instance a reclaimed use of ‘bitch’ 
conveys a content along the lines of “We women are laudable for being 
women”. In other words, Ritchie endorses the idea that the ambiguity 
between reclaimed and non-reclaimed uses of slurs deeply differs from 
standard instances of ambiguity and provides a story to explain why 
appropriation gives rise to such a unique case of ambiguity.
In this section I present an alternative and simpler solution. My 
claim is that the ambiguity between reclaimed and non-reclaimed 
slurs is not particular nor problematic and I try to show that other 
instances of ambiguity display similar properties: the context, together 
with speaker’s intentions, provides constraints on who can felicitously 
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access a certain meaning of a polysemic term in each situation. As a 
matter of fact, (i) contexts typically include information about the rela-
tions among the speakers as well as information about the beliefs and 
attitudes of the participants to the conversation and (ii) such informa-
tion can drive the interpretation of expressions and utterances.
Let us now turn to the instance of ambiguity that I take to prove 
the non-exceptionalness of reclamation. Consider for instance the use 
of ‘tu’ and ‘vous’ in French or ‘tu’ and ‘lei’ in Italian. The ‘vous’ and ‘lei’ 
forms are the formal pronouns used to formally address the interlocu-
tor in French and Italian respectively. More importantly, both of them 
are identical to another personal pronoun that is neutral with respect 
to the parameter of formality: in French, ‘vous’ can be either the formal 
singular second-person pronoun or the formal/informal plural second-
person pronoun; in Italian ‘lei’ can be either the formal singular second-
person pronoun or the formal/informal singular third-person pronoun. 
Suppose that A addresses B in Italian and says: 
(1) Lei gradisce del tè?
  (a) Would you [formal] like some tea?
  (b) Would she [informal/formal] like some tea?
As it is, (1) is ambiguous between (1a) “Would you like some tea?” (for-
mal) and (1 b) “Would she like some tea?” (formal or informal), because 
the formal second-person pronoun ‘lei’ is identical to the singular third-
person pronoun ‘lei’ (formal or informal).
Given the social information provided by the context, the addressee 
will typically access one interpretation or the other and understand 
whether the term at stake is a second or third-person pronoun. Such 
information about the social relations of the speaker does not only 
drive the interpretation from the point of view of the addressee: it also 
constrains which meaning of ‘lei’ (‘you’ or ‘she’) each speaker can felici-
tously express. We could describe the situation as follows: only those 
speakers who are in an informal relation to the addressee can felici-
tously use (1) and be taken to say “Would she like some tea?”; and only 
the speakers who are in a formal relation to the addressee can felici-
tously use (1) to mean (and be taken to mean) “Would you like some 
tea?”. Note also that for the use of (1) (as meaning (b)) to be felicitous, 
it is not enough that the speaker thinks that she is in an informal rela-
tion to her addressee; also her addressee has to recognize her as being 
in an informal relation with him. The same goes if the speaker intends 
to use (1) as meaning (a): for such an utterance to be felicitous, it is not 
enough that the speaker thinks that she is in a formal relation to her 
addressee; also her addressee has to recognize her as being in a formal 
relation with him. The same goes for the French and Spanish equiva-
lent cases of polysemic pronouns.
The ‘lei’ example suggests that the Reclamation Worry raised by 
Anderson and Lepore might be just an apparent worry. The ambiguity 
between formal and informal personal pronouns shows that the am-
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biguity between negative and positive senses of slurs is not the only 
case where social information about the speaker and about her rela-
tion to the others can affect the way in which a polysemic term is both 
used and interpreted. The clues that help us decide in which sense a 
polysemic term is used are provided by the context (broadly construed) 
and by the intentions of the speakers. If that is correct, then the Rec-
lamation Worry should not be seen as an objection to content-based 
theories, as Anderson and Lepore suggested, nor as evidence in favor of 
an indexical account of the lexical content of reclaimed slurs, as Ritchie 
suggests. The ambiguity between reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs 
would be just another instance of the following phenomenon: socially 
important information determines and constrains the senses in which 
terms can be used by speakers and interpreted by hearers.
As we shall see in greater detail in Section 5, the indexical account 
proposed by Ritchie has to strongly rely on contextual factors such as 
speaker intentions and the like in order to explain the ‘outsider’ cas-
es, namely – in her terminology, that I adopt – the cases where out-
groups can use slurs non-derogatorily. According to a naïve version of 
the indexical account of reclaimed slurs, a felicitous outsider use of a 
reclaimed slur could not be, due to an infelicitous use of the indexical 
‘we’. We shall see that in order to fi x such a problem, Ritchie employs 
similar resources to those we are invoking here to explain the ambigu-
ity between reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs. I will conclude that a 
more parsimonious answer to the RW should be preferred.
4. Authoritativeness
It is surely a useful simplifi cation to hold that what is typical of appro-
priation is that it starts and spreads among in-groups. However, there 
are good reasons not to frame the Reclamation Worry in terms of appro-
priated uses being accessible for in-groups only and offensive uses be-
ing accessible for out-groups and possibly in-groups. If the shift or ex-
tension from in-groups to out-groups was not available, it would not be 
possible to explain outsider cases, nor how reclamation can fi nally lead 
to slurring terms losing their derogatory power for good. If that is cor-
rect, what makes a non-pejorative use of slurs possible in general does 
not amount to the category(s) to which the speaker belongs, but rather, 
how likely it is for the speaker to be taken as genuinely and felicitously 
expressing a positive attitude towards the target class. In other words, 
what is at stake is whether the audience accepts the speaker’s inten-
tion of dissociating from the negative use of slurs and subverting such 
a use, not necessarily whether the speaker belongs to the target group 
or not. Is then the in-group/out-group description of appropriation just 
wrong? Of course not. To be an in-group is the safest way (or one of the 
safest ways) for a speaker to be accepted as genuinely5 (i) expressing 
5 One reason to stress that the attitude has to be recognized as ‘genuine’ is that 
people who do not undergo certain kind of discriminations themselves are not always 
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a dissociative attitude with respect to bigot beliefs typically conveyed 
by slurs and (ii) communicating a positive attitude6 towards the target 
group. However, as many cases show, this does not need to be the case. 
The mere fact that reclaimed uses can be open to out-groups signals 
that the right direction to go in phrasing the Reclamation Worry is 
not in terms of in-groups and out-groups but in terms of ‘believabil-
ity’ or ‘authoritativeness’ of the subject. How much a subject is taken 
to be authoritative depends on many complex factors that vary on a 
case-by-case basis (hence, the discussion inside and outside academia 
concerning who can use reclaimed slurs; see footnote 3): for sure it is 
important with which groups she can identify with, but also what kind 
of experiences she had undergo, how clear her beliefs and her stance 
towards bigotry are and so on. My claim is that being an in-group is 
just one way to be very authoritative and I present a scenario that I 
take to support my claim. Take three men, John, Peter and Bob. They 
are gay. John is an activist and spent his entire life fi ghting homopho-
bia. Peter, on the other hand, never felt like telling anyone that he is 
gay, except for very few people. He is very discreet about it and never 
participates to LGBTQ+ pride events. He never engages in discussions 
about gay marriage nor anything related to LGBTQ+ rights. Suppose 
Bob is a close friend of both and knows they are gay. One day, on dif-
ferent occasions, Bob hears them talking about a common friend being 
‘a fag’. My intuition is that John is somehow more entitled than Peter 
to use the slur ‘fag’ in a positive way. In particular, I would expect Bob 
to have no doubts in interpreting John’s use of the slur as reclaimed 
and to feel uneasy or dubious about Peter’s use of the term. If what al-
lows speakers to access positive uses of slurs was ‘just’ their belonging 
to the target group, and if we grant that the group targeted by the slur 
‘fag’ is gay men, then we cannot account for the intuition that John’s 
reclaimed use of a homophobic slur is more acceptable than Peter’s use. 
The only way to save the in-groupness account of reclamation would 
be either (i) to say that Peter should count as less of an in-group than 
John, which does not make much sense if the target of the homophobic 
taken to be entitled to express solidarity attitudes nor to use appropriation. Think 
about the fact that while right now, as Ritchie notices, it is nearly impossible for men 
in general to use ‘bitch’ in a reclaimed way, gay men are sometimes (sometimes!) 
allowed to do so.
6 An interesting issue is whether the attitude expressed in reclamation contexts 
has to be positive or just non-negative. As I see it, in the fi rst phases of reclamation, 
the attitude expressed by the speaker/the content conveyed by the term (this 
depends on what theory of appropriation one favours) has to be positive for a certain 
occurrence of a slur to count as – and to be taken as – reclaimed. However, since 
appropriation can lead to a point where the slur loses its derogatory power for good 
and becomes a neutral term (think of the case of ‘gay’) rather than a positive word, 
then it’s plausible to think of reclaimed uses of slurs such that the speaker does not 
convey any positive content, she just fails to convey negative ones. I’d like to thank 
Erich Rast for pushing me on this point.
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slur ‘fag’ are gay men, or (ii) to say that the group targeted by ‘fag’ is not 
gay men, but gay activists, which is also quite implausible.
A more promising way to explain why Peter could be perceived as 
less entitled than the activist John to use ‘fag’ in a positive way is in 
terms of authoritativeness. It is easier for Bob to recognize John’s anti-
homophobic intentions and attitudes, while he would harbor doubts 
about whether or not Peter’s dissociative attitude with respect to ho-
mophobia and Peter’s solidarity attitude with respect to the LGBTQ+ 
are truly genuine. And, again, this has nothing to do with Peter’s being 
a member of the target class or not. It is about the authoritativeness 
that Peter is granted in a group.
The more a slur gets reclaimed, the less authoritativeness is needed 
to felicitously access the non-derogatory meaning: the less problematic 
a term becomes, the less is needed to recognize the speaker’s intentions 
as felicitously communicating non-derogatory attitudes.
We cannot account for the John-Peter case intuitions if we stick 
to the in-group/out-group schema, nor can we account for the outsider 
cases: we need to think in terms of authoritativeness, legitimacy and 
believability in order to account for the criteria on the basis of which 
speakers can or cannot access reclaimed uses of slurs.
5. In- and out-groupness: the outsider cases
In Section 3, I argued that the Reclamation Worry does not arise at all, 
since it is not surprising that in cases of polysemy or ambiguity, com-
plex social information is required for the speaker to use the ambiguous 
term with a certain meaning and for the hearer to interpret it correctly. 
In doing so, I claimed that the indexical account of appropriated slurs 
should not be invoked as a solution to the Reclamation Worry, since the 
worry does not arise in the fi rst place. Moreover, in Section 4, I claimed 
that the main criterion with which certain uses of slurs are interpreted 
as reclaimed seems to deal with recognizing and accepting speakers’ in-
tentions on the basis of the authoritativeness they are granted, rather 
than just considering whether speakers belong or not to a group.
In this section, I come back to the outsider cases to show that they 
speak in favor of my claim and reveal some lack of parsimony on the 
side of the indexical account of reclaimed slurs.
The outsider cases are, as we said, those cases where out-groups use 
slurs non-derogatorily. The reclaimed use of slurs like ‘queer’ is a good 
and well-known example, since out-groups can felicitously use a slur in 
a positive or neutral way7 (think of expressions such as Queer Studies, 
Queer Tango, Queer Film Festival, the acronym LGBTQ+, etc). But 
there are many other cases where the possibility for the outsider’s re-
7 Ritchie excludes from her investigation cases such as ‘queer’, where the process 
of appropriation led to a point where a speaker clearly does not need to identify with 
the target class in order to use the slur in a reclaimed way. However, I think it is 
crucial for a satisfactory account of reclamation to be able to explain this phase, too.
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claimed use to be felicitous or not depends very much on the context: 
under the adequate circumstances, an out-group can use a slur in a 
positive way, but it does not only depend on her intentions. It is crucial 
for the indexical account to explain how these uses are even possible. 
As a matter of fact, it looks prima facie very hard for the indexical ac-
count of reclaimed slurs to explain how an out-group could felicitously 
use a slur in a positive way: if reclaimed slurs involve the occurrence 
of an indexical ‘we’, when an out-group uses a ‘we’, it should be infe-
licitous. Ritchie addresses the problem by introducing the notion of ‘in-
sider’ status. The outsider cases are not infelicitous because under cer-
tain circumstances out-groups can get something like an insider status, 
they can count as belonging to a ‘we’ even though they do not belong to 
the target group. The ‘insider’ status makes their use of the indexical 
‘we’ felicitous despite the out-groupness of the speaker.
I would resist this move for two reasons. The fi rst one is that such 
an explanation does not account for all the data of reclaimed slurs, but 
only for a subset. In fact, while it could be an adequate description of 
some outsider uses, speakers need not always perceive (and be taken 
as perceiving) themselves and the target class as a ‘we’ in order to use 
reclaimed slurs. For instance, a scholar using the term ‘queer’ in talk-
ing about ‘Queer Studies’ is not necessarily identifying herself with the 
target class (she can of course; but she does not need to). The outsider 
cases actually show that what is at stake is not whether a speaker 
belongs or not to a category, nor whether she can talk about the target 
class using a plural fi rst-person pronoun. The beliefs and intentions of 
each one in each context, together with the way in which such beliefs 
and intentions are recognized and accepted, seem to constitute what 
makes a use of a slur reclaimed or not. Then, again, as it was said in 
Section 4, belonging to a group is a strong contextual clue of what the 
speaker’s intentions and attitudes are, but it is not all there is.
Moreover, the indexical account ends up relying on notions such 
as intention attribution and recognition, as well as something close to 
authoritativeness (namely the ‘insider’ status), in order to explain the 
outsider cases; but once one invokes these notions to explain the out-
sider uses, these notions turn out to be just enough to account for all 
reclaimed uses. In other words, there is no need to postulate hidden 
indexicals for reclaimed uses of slurs, if the outsider cases already re-
quire us to rely on intention interpretation, and some relevant social 
relations involving the speaker (authoritativeness, in my terminology). 
My conclusion is that a more parsimonious response to the RW should 
be preferred to the indexical account and that the indexical explanation 
of Reclamation would need further justifi cation to be defended.
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6. Conclusion: A brief methodological remark
The debate on appropriation started when philosophers of language 
and linguists became interested in slurs and pejorative language. How-
ever, it is easy to observe instances of valence reversal that we might 
call ‘reclamation’ for any kind of evaluative term. Slurs are not the only 
evaluative words that used to be negative and that were used positively 
until the point where the term lost its pejorative power for good. I con-
sider just two famous examples from the history of poetry and painting. 
Let us start from the most ancient one. In a letter to Atticus,8 Cicero 
calls a group of poets ‘neoteroi’ (from the greek ‘νεώτεροι’, ‘the newer 
ones’), disregarding this avant-garde interested in introducing in poet-
ry new stylistic features and new themes. Two centuries after, a group 
of poets called themselves ‘the novel poets’, after the neoteroi. The term 
lost its derogatory power, even if it was initially created and used as 
derogatory by Cicero. First, it was used positively by those later poets 
who were very much inspired by the group that Cicero scornfully called 
‘neoteroi’ and nowadays ‘neoteroi’ is how the scientifi c community neu-
trally calls these very much appreciated poets. Another (possibly more 
famous) example concerns the impressionists. The French term ‘im-
pressioniste’ was disdainfully introduced by a critic, Louis Leroy, in the 
journal Le Charivari in 1874.9 Not long after, the term was used again, 
but in a positive sense, by Jules-Antoine Castagnary in his paper “Ex-
position du boulevard des Capucines. Les impressionnistes”, published 
on Le Siècle.10 Nowadays, we still call these artists ‘impressionists’ with 
no trace of disdain. Besides these examples, we can fi nd many more 
instances of appropriation from very different fi elds that have nothing 
to do with slurs as they are commonly understood.11 Just to mention 
a few, the English adjective ‘terrifi c’, coming from the Latin adjective 
‘terrifi cus’ (frightening), underwent a process of valence change. Until 
1880s, it meant – just like in Latin and contemporary Italian – ‘hor-
rible’ or ‘frightening’. From around the 1880s, it starts meaning ‘excel-
lent’, which is its standard meaning today in English.12 Or take the 
adjective ‘bárbaro’ in Spanish: it used to be exclusively negative (mean-
8 From the Epistulae ad Atticum, Book 7, Letter 2 (year 50 B.C.). Latin text 
available online: http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=Per
seusLatinTexts&query=Cic.%20Att.%207.2&getid=0. 
9 Leroy, Louis (1874), L’Exposition des impressionnistes, Le Charivari, April 
25th 1874.
10 Castagnary, Jules-Antoine (1874), Exposition du boulevard des Capucines. Les 
impressionnistes, Le Siècle April 29th, pp. 1-10.
11 Nunberg (forthcoming) claims that that of ‘slur’ is a fairly recent notion. I 
do not agree with Nunberg on this point, but even if he was right, the 2000 year 
old case of ‘neoteroi’ shows that appropriation is not a recent nor slurs-only-related 
phenomenon.
12 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=terrifi c&
searchmode=none.
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ing ‘horrible’) and nowadays it can also be used positively (‘fantastic’).13 
The reason why I mention these apparently unrelated cases is to 
make a methodological point: appropriation should be seen as a gen-
eral phenomenon that is not restricted to slurs.14 The reclamation of 
slurs is just one instance of valence change. I grant that the possibility 
of reversing the valence of an evaluative term becomes particularly 
crucial and politically precious when it comes to socially loaded terms 
like slurs, but this does not mean that we ought to study appropriation 
as a characterizing feature of slurs only. When investigating the ap-
propriation of slurs, it is important to bear in mind that it is a general 
mechanism, not only related to slurs. In order to provide a satisfactory 
account of appropriation, a much broader stance is required.
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